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EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION OR
RECOVER DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Plaintiffs, former employees, at both congressional investigating
committee and company hearings refused to answer questions con-
cerning their affiliation with the Communist Party as a result of which
they were discharged. Grievances were filed under the provisions of
the collective-bargaining agreement but when the plaintiffs refused to
make full disclosure to the union regarding Communist Party member-
ship the union refused to press their grievances to arbitration. The
employees thereupon brought suit against the union and the company
to compel arbitration of their grievances and to recover damages
resulting from said discharge. The actions were removed to the fed-
eral court. On motions for summary judgment filed by all parties the
District Court of Maryland granted those of the defendants. Held:
Under a collective bargaining agreement containing provisions for dis-
charge and grievance procedures, employees have no standing either
to sue for damages resulting from wrongful discharge, or to compel
arbitration unless the union has acted arbitrarily or discriminatorily
and thereby violated its duty of fair representation; in this instance
the action by the union was justified because it had the right and
duty to screen grievances and it was unable to do so since the plaintiffs
refused to devulge information essential to the evaluation of their
claims. Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers of America.'
The decision is in accord with the indecisive weight of authority
which holds that the typical grievance procedures provided by collec-
tive bargaining agreements preclude the individual from suing the
employer or union for damages or to compel arbitration' Courts
which have followed this rule are those which have adopted the
philosophy that the rights of employees under a collective bargaining
agreement are collectivized and no independent individual rights
remain so long as the union representative properly performs his
duties.' However, despite the "decisional trend" 4 treating individual
1
 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959).
2 Parker v. Borock, 1 App. Div. 2d 969, 150 N.Y.S.2d 396 (2d Dep't 1956); aff'd,
5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959); Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-
T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1959) ; Tire11 v. Local 758, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinist, 150 Cal. App. 2d 24, 309 P.2d 130 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1957); see also, 141
Cal. App. 2d 17, 296 P.2d 100 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1956); cf. United States v. Vosges,
124 F. Supp. 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
3 See Cox, "Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements," 8 Lab.
L.J. 850 (1957); Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601
(1956); Hanslowe, "Individual Rights In Collective Labor Relations" 45 Corn. L.Q. 25
(1959).
4 Hanslowe, op. cit. supra note 3 at 36.
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suits as barred by a union controlled grievance procedure a number
of courts have granted individual reiief. 8 These courts follow the
rationale of Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. v. Burley' which recognizes
the individual as having certain vested rights under a collective bar-
gaining agreement with respect to which the union cannot make a
binding settlement without his consent. It is submitted that because
of the peculiar provisions of the Railway Labor Act 7 this decision
should not be controlling outside the railroad industry.
The focal point of dissension among the courts is the type of
remedy which should be afforded an individual under a collective
bargaining agreement. An analysis of the theoretical nature of the
agreement adds little to the solution of the problem but aids in under-
standing the source of the individual's rights. 8 One view is that
although a collective bargaining agreement gives no rights to an indi-
vidual employee his employment contract incorporates the union
agreement either by local custom or force of law" Under this view
the legal relationship between employer, union, and employee is con-
ceived as two bilateral contracts. The first consists of those promises
for the benefit of the union as an organization while the second con-
sists of the individual contract of hire incorporating those promises
between the union and the company which were made for the em-
ployee's benefit. Only the employee can make a binding settlement as
to the second. A second theory considers the collective bargaining
agreement as a contract in which the individual employee is a third
party beneficiary. 1 ° A third view loosely compares the collective bar-
gaining agreement with a trust. 11 According to this view the union
occupies a position comparable to that of trustee and as such holds
the employer's promise in trust for the benefit of the employee. Any
breach of the fiduciary obligations by the union would give the em-
ployee a cause of action against the union.
6 Kosely v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc. 251 F,2d 588 (7th Cir. 1958) (applying Indiana
Law); Nichols v. National Tube Co., 122 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ohio 1954); In re
Norwalk Tire Co., 100 F. Supp. 706 (D. Conn. 1951) (applying Connecticut law);
Alabama Power Co. v. Haywood, 266 Ala. 194, 95 So. 2d 98 (1957).
6 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
7 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. lei 151-188 ( 195 8).
8 For a comprehensive analysis of the theoretical nature of a collective bargaining
agreement see Cox, "Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements," 8
Lab. L.J. 850 (1957); Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601
(1956).
9 Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F.2d 623
(3rd Cir. 1954), aff'd 348 U.S. 437 (1954).
10 Leahy v. Smith, 137 Cal. App, 2d 884, 290 P.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Hudak v.
Hornell Industries, 304 N.Y. 207, 106 N.E.2d 609 (1952).
11 Cox, "Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements," 8 Lab. L.j.
850 (1957).
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Whether the individual has a cause of action for damages
against the union depends, under federal law, on whether the union
has breached its duty of fair representation. 12 The problem of indi-
vidual enforcement of arbitration under a collective bargaining agree-
ment is more complex. There is no authoritative decision as to whether
federal or state law should be applied in determining whether and
under what circumstances an employee may enforce arbitration under
a collective bargaining agreement. The court in the principal case,
although noting that the rationale of Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills"
indicates federal law should be applied, avoided the problem by decid-
ing Federal and Maryland law were identical. Another problem arises
as to whether the employee should seek his remedy against the union
or the employer. The union is a wrongdoer in that it has breached its
duty of fair representation. If the employee has a valid claim against
the employer, however, the employer would be the original wrong-
doer since it has breached the collective bargaining agreement. It is
unlikely that the employee will get adequate representation by com-
pelling an unwilling union to arbitrate his grievance, and so, he should
be given a direct right against the employer either to compel the em-
ployer to arbitrate with him directly or alternatively to recover
damages resulting from wrongful discharge.
The final question is whether an individual can enforce arbitra-
tion in the face of a bona fide refusal on the part of the union to
represent him in such a proceeding. The answer depends upon one's
interpretation of Sec. 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act" and
whether one is willing to accept the philosophy of collectivism. The
proviso that "any individual employee or group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer,
without the intervention of the bargaining representative"" has been
interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board" to mean that the
employee must be permitted personally to present his claim through
every stage of the grievance procedure up to and including arbitration.
The Hughes case involved a discriminatory refusal by the union to
process grievances. On review the Fifth Circuit" affirmed with
emphasis upon the discriminatory aspect of the case. Viewed in this
light there is no inconsistency with the holding in the principal case.
12 Syres v. Oil Workers Intl Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944).
13 .353 U.S. 448 (1957).
14 41 Stat. 453 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
la 41 Stat. 453 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1958).
16 Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944).
17 Hughes Tool Co. v. N.L.R.B. 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
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The Ostrof sky case offers an equitable and expedient solution to
an unsettled problem in labor law. While- it accepts the basis of
collectivism by giving the union alone the power to settle grievances
under collective bargaining agreements it protects the individual from
arbitrary and discriminatory action by the union. Thus, the danger
of "untrammeled individual enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements"" resulting in a breakdown of sound labor-management
relations is eliminated while the individual is afforded adequate pro-
tection from unfair dealings on the part of either the union or the
company.
RONALD R. POPEO
18 Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956).
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